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POLICING THE POLICE: PROTECTING CIVI REMEDIES IN
CASES OF RETALIATORY ARREST
For over two hundred years, the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution has served as the bedrock of our democratic system
of government. The First Amendment has long been viewed as the quin-
tessential guarantee of freedom, enabling individuals to voice contrary
and unpopular opinions without fear of reprisal. It is these most funda-
mental American rights-the right to free speech, to free press, and to
free assembly-that we associate with the greatness of our nation. These
freedoms hold an elevated place not only in our system of government
and political discourse, but also in our everyday lives. Accordingly, as a
nation we have long sought to protect these fundamental rights against
encroachment from both external and internal threats. In seeking to pro-
tect these rights, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' granting the federal
courts jurisdiction over constitutional tort actions. Congress's intent in
passing § 1983 was to utilize the federal courts to protect the constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights of individuals in the face of governmental op-
2
pression. Over time, the judicially created doctrines of absolute and
qualified immunity have narrowed the ability of individuals to gain re-
dress against governmental actors for constitutional violations.
Reichle v. Howards4 a case recently heard by the Supreme Court-
on appeal from the Tenth Circuit-provided the Court with the oppor-
tunity to decide whether law enforcement officials should be immune
from civil suits for arrests made in retaliation against an individual exer-
cising free speech.5 In an earlier case, Hartman v. Moore,6 the Court
ruled that probable cause did bar civil actions alleging retaliatory prose-
cution.' Varying interpretations of the Hartman decision have resulted in
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides that any person who, under color of law, deprives
another of his constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities can be held liable in a suit of law or
equity. Enacted by Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the original purpose of the legislation was to provide protection to black
citizens who were being discriminated against, abused, and murdered, oftentimes at the hands of, or
with the permission of local government and police officials. This protection has, over time, been
expanded to provide all individuals the ability to seek civil redress against governmental actors who
violate their constitutionally guaranteed rights. See infra Part L.A.
2. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REV. 511, 512-
13(1989).
3. See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort
Claims for Nominal Damages, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2011); see also David Rudovski,
Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricting Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
1199,1213 (2005).
4. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
5. Id at 2091.
6. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
7. Id. at 252.
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some courts applying Hartman to retaliatory arrest cases, while others
limit Hartman's application to cases of retaliatory prosecution.8 Instead
of either explicitly extending or restricting Hartman, the Reichle's Court
held only that the arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity
because at the time of arrest the arrestee did not have a "clearly estab-
lished right."9 In doing so, the Court punted on the more important legal
issue, 0 thereby insuring a continued circuit split, and continued debate as
to the role that probable cause should play in civil suits for retaliatory
arrests.
Prior to the case reaching the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit in
Howards v. McLaughlin," provided a definitive statement of its treat-
ment of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases. Because the Supreme
Court decision fails to reach this important legal question, this Comment
will analyze the Tenth Circuit's holding, and argue that while probable
cause should be a consideration, it should not axiomatically provide of-
ficers with immunity for arrests executed with the intention of quelling
free speech. Part I of this Comment will examine the genesis of constitu-
tional tort law, the evolution of retaliatory case law, and the current split
among the federal circuits as to whether the absence of probable cause is
a requirement in retaliation cases. Part II summarizes the facts, procedur-
al history, and opinions of the Tenth Circuit case Howards v. McLaugh-
lin. Part III argues that the Tenth Circuit was correct, and probable cause
should not be a bar to retaliatory arrest claims because the existence of
probable cause does not preclude retaliatory causation. Part III also ad-
dresses the current circuit split by distinguishing Howards from the Su-
preme Court's earlier holding in Hartman. Lastly, Part 1V analyzes the
arguments presented to the Supreme Court, and gives insight into how
the Court should ultimately rule on this issue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Constitutional Tort Law
Section 198312 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFeder-
al Bureau of Narcotics1 3 provide civil remedies when any person acting
8. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
9. See Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
10. See id. ("We granted certiorari on two questions: whether a First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim may lie despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest, and whether clearly
established law at the time of the Howards' arrest so held. If the answer to either question is 'no,'
then the agents are entitled to qualified immunity. We elect to address only the second question."
(citations omitted)).
I. 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088
(2012). The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying Agents Daniels and McLaugh-
lin's motion for qualified immunity and for judgment as a matter of law, as neither took any action
that demonstrated a retaliatory intent. Therefore, the case name was changed on petition to the Su-
preme Court to Reichle v. Howards.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a private right of action for violations of an individual's
rights under the color of state law).
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under color of law deprives another of his constitutional rights, privileg-
es, or immunities. Together, § 1983 and Bivens serve as the basis of what
legal commentators have labeled "constitutional tort litigation." 4 Consti-
tutional tort litigation gives individuals the ability to bring actions against
police and other governmental actors outside of the limited confines of
state law tort systems." Section 1983 was initially passed by Congress as
§ I of Civil Rights Act of 1871, and was intended to enforce the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The legislation originally sought
to provide protection to black citizens against discrimination from gov-
ernment and police officials by giving them access to the federal court
system to seek redress for constitutional violations committed under the
color of state law.17
The modem interpretation of § 1983 was articulated by the Supreme
Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,' where, for the first time, the
Court held that § 1983 did not require an action taken under an express
state law or custom.19 Instead, the Court held that § 1983 provides reme-
dies when an official acting based on the power afforded them by state
law violates an individual's rights under the Constitution or federal law.20
This decision significantly expanded the scope of actions that could be
brought under § 1983, thereby extending the expansive remedies availa-
ble in constitutional tort cases. The Court's 1971 decision in Bivens fur-
ther expanded constitutional tort law by recognizing the existence of an
implied cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights were
violated under the color of federal law.2 1
While the Court's decisions in Monroe and Bivens significantly ex-
panded constitutional tort law, the Court's actions over the past half cen-
tury in restricting remedies have dramatically limited the practical appli-
cation of these rights.22 The language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had
no provision for absolute or qualified immunity.2 3 However, the judicial-
ly created doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity have, over time,
carved out numerous exceptions to the statutory liability of § 1983. The-
se immunity doctrines limit who can be sued under the statute, while at
the same time providing defendants with ever more expansive tools to
13. 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971) (recognizing an implied cause of action for individuals
whose constitutional rights are violated under the color of federal law).
14. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1987).
15. Id. at 645 ("In cases involving government officials and constitutional rights, section 1983
actions supplement, if not replace, traditional state law tort systems.").
16. See Burke & Burton, supra note 2, at 512.
17. Id. at 513.
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruledby Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
19. Id. at 173-75, 192.
20. Id.
21. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392-97 (1971).
22. See Rudovski, supra note 3, at 1206.
23. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502 (1978).
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deflect liability. 24 Today, judges and prosecutors enjoy absolute immuni-
ty,25 and other government agents (including law enforcement) are af-
forded qualified immunity. 26 The Court has placed further restrictions on
remedies by only recognizing municipal liability in very narrow circum-
stances, and by putting in place extensive exhaustion of remedies re-
27quirements. Recent decisions indicate the Court's continued deference
to governmental actors in all but the most egregious cases of miscon-
duct.28
B. Retaliatory Framework: Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle
The framework for proving retaliatory claims for violations of con-
stitutional rights was established by the Supreme Court's 1977 decision
in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.29 The
case involved a public school teacher who was fired by the local school
board after leaking the contents of an internal memorandum to a local
radio station.3 0 The teacher brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim-
ing that the board terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 1 The lower court found
that the teacher's speech was a "substantial factor" in him not being re-
hired, and thereby held that the Board had violated his First Amendment
rights.32
The Supreme Court did not overturn the lower court's holding;
however, it did articulate a two-part burden shifting analysis for proving
retaliatory claims.33 First, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a
prima facie case of retaliation by showing that his conduct was constitu-
tionally protected, and that the constitutionally protected conduct was a
"substantial factor" in the action taken against him.34 Once the plaintiff
demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant, who
must show that in the absence of the protected conduct, it would have
taken the same action. 35 While this burden shifting test continues to hold
24. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 497, 500-02 (1992) (explaining the many differ-
ent approaches the Court has used to formulate the doctrine of qualified immunity).
25. Id at5ll-12.
26. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508 ("[Q]ualified immunity from damages liability should be the general
rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations . . .
27. See Rudovski, supra note 3, at 1213-29.
28. Id. at 1254-55; see also Thompson v. Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365-66 (2011) (holding
that neither a district attorney nor a municipality can be held civilly liable under § 1983 when a
prosecutor intentionally withholds evidence that leads to eighteen years of wrongful incarceration).
29. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
30. See id. at 281-82.
31. Id at 276.
32. Id. at 283.
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sway over most retaliatory claims, subsequent court decisions have
carved out exceptions to this framework. Often these exceptions are
plagued by circuit splits, as evident in prisoner cases, where some courts
continue to apply Mt. Healthy, while other courts have abandoned the
framework.3 6 Similarly, cases involving retaliatory counterclaims are
treated differently depending on the circuit in which they are decided.37
Recently, the conflicting analysis between circuits regarding retaliatory
prosecution cases forced the Supreme Court to address the issue.
C. The Pre-Hartman Split
Outside of the above noted exceptions, the Mt. Healthy framework
for retaliatory claims continues to be largely applied by the courts.
However, there is a split among the circuits as to the required pleading
standard for claims against law enforcement officers for retaliatory ar-
rest.4 0 Before the Court's decision in Hartman v. Moore, the Second,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits had clearly articulated decisions that
required a plaintiff to prove that the arrest occurred in the absence of
probable cause.41 However, the D.C. and the Tenth Circuits expressly
permitted claims for retaliatory arrests to be brought irrespective of the
absence of probable cause.42 The Court's decision in Hartman, articulat-
ing the pleading standards for retaliatory prosecution cases, has prompted
new debate as to what standards should be applied in retaliatory arrest
cases.4 3
36. See John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest
Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 764-65 (2009) (citing McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.
1979) (noting that the plaintiff has a substantial burden to prove that the transfer was motivated by
retaliatory animus)); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the Mt. Healthy
burden shifting analysis to a prison case).
37. See Koerner, supra note 36, at 766-67 (citing Greenwich Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Warren Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs were "neverthe-
less required to persuade the jury that the counterclaims were filed, not as a legitimate response to
litigation, but as a form of retaliation")). But see Venable v. Keever, 263 F.3d 162, 2001 WL
803565, at *2 (5th Cir. June 12, 2001) (unpublished table decision) (dismissing claim as frivolous).
38. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
39. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1146 (10th Cir. 2011), rev d sub nom.
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *13, Reichle v. Howards, 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2011) (No. 11-262), 2011 WL 3809375.
41. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2007); Wood v.
Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 883 (11th Cir. 2003); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2002);
Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (2d Cir. 1992).
42. See, e.g., Poole v. Cnty. of Otero, 271 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2001), abrogated by
Hartman, 547 U.S. 250; Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogat-
ed by Hartman, 547 U.S. 250.
43. See, e.g., Colin P. Watson, Limiting a Constitutional Tort Without Probable Cause: First
Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, 107 MICH. L. REV. 111, 111 (2010) ("Hartman neither
requires nor supports a rule that the presence of probable cause for effectuating the underlying arrest
precludes a claim for First Amendment retaliatory arrest."); Koerner, supra note 36, at 777 ("Hart-
man and its requirement of no-probable-cause pleading should apply only to a subset of retaliatory
arrest cases-cases of complex causation where a retaliating government official induces the police
offer to arrest the plaintiff.").
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D. Hartman v. Moore
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Hartman v. Moore resolved a long-
standing circuit split regarding whether plaintiffs were required to plead
and prove the absence of probable cause when bringing a claim of retali-
atory prosecution." The Hartman Court addressed this question in the
context of a dispute between a private business and the United States
Postal Service. 45 During the 1980's, William Moore, the CEO of Recog-
nition Equipment Incorporated (REI), was aggressively urging the Postal
Service into using REI's multi-line scanning equipment.46 At that time,
top officials within the Postal Service were advocating for the continued
use of single-line scanners. 47 In seeking to advance the cause of his busi-
ness, and despite requests by the Postmaster General to be silent on the
issue, Mr. Moore hired a public-relations firm to lobby Congress for the
adoption of a multi-line scanning standard.48 These efforts proved suc-
cessful, and in 1985 the Postal Service adopted multi-line technology.49
Following the Postal Service decision, REI was not awarded any of
government contracts, and instead became the subject of two separate
investigations by Postal Service inspectors.50 Ultimately, the United
States Attorney's office prosecuted Moore and REI.5 ' The Court, citing
what it called a "complete lack of direct evidence," granted defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal.52 Following the criminal trial, Moore
brought a civil action for liability under Bivens,53 claiming, inter alia,
that the prosecutor and postal inspectors had prosecuted him in retalia-
tion for his criticism of the United States Postal Service, thereby violat-
ing his First Amendment rights.54
In seeking to resolve the existing circuit split on the probable cause
issue, the Court held that in a retaliatory prosecution action, the plaintiff
must plead and prove an absence of probable cause.55 The Court's deci-
sion rested on three grounds: (1) the analysis of the causation require-
ment necessary to prove discriminatory animus; (2) the uniqueness of the
causation chain in retaliatory prosecution cases; and (3) the strong pre-
44. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
45. Id at 254.
46. Id at 252-53.
47. Id at 252.
48. Id at 253.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 253-54.
52. Id. at 254.
53. For the purpose of retaliatory claims, courts draw no distinction between analyzing a
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30
(1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978) ("[I]t would be 'untenable to draw a
distinction for the purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials § 1983 and
suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials."')).
54. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254.
55. Id. at 265-66.
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sumption of prosecutorial regularity that has long existed in our common
law jurisprudence.5 Stating that the "presumption that a prosecutor has
legitimate grounds for the action he takes is one we do not lightly dis-
card," the Court held that plaintiffs must prove the absence of probable
cause to overcome the presumptive deference given to prosecutorial de-
cisions.57
E. Post-Hartman Split
While the Hartman Court articulated a clear rule regarding the need
to plead the absence of probable cause in retaliatory prosecution cases,
the impact of its decision on retaliatory arrest cases remains unclear."
The Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Hart-
man's heightened pleading standard as being applicable to all retaliatory
constitutional tort claims.5 9 The Tenth Circuit, interpreting Hartman as
only applicable to cases of prosecutorial retaliation, continues to allow
retaliation claims to be brought even when there is evidence of probable
cause.60 The confusion, however, does not end there. The Ninth Circuit,
which prior to Hartman had no precedent addressing this issue, has since
adopted the Tenth Circuit's view that the existence of probable cause is
not a barrier to First Amendment retaliation claims.61 The Sixth Circuit,
which prior to Hartman had not required plaintiffs to prove an absence of
probable cause, initially reversed itself, applying Hartman to all retalia-
tory claims (not simply retaliatory prosecution claims).62 However, more
recent decisions show the Sixth Circuit may be moving away from this
bright-line rule.63
56. Id at 260-63.
57. Id. at 263, 265-66.
58. Koerner, supra note 36, at 775 ("Retaliatory arrest case law is a mess, with some courts
siding entirely with Hartman, others rejecting Hartman outright, and still others having yet to take a
position.").
59. See, e.g., McCabe v, Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2010) ("Lack of probable
cause is a necessary element of all the claims McCabe and Nelson brought arising from the allegedly
unlawful arrest."); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F. App'x 928, 929 (1 Ith Cir. 2007) (requiring a showing of
no probable cause); Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that retaliatory arrest falls under Hartman); Curley v. Vill. of Suffem, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[B]ecause defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, an inquiry into the underlying motive
for the arrest need not be undertaken.").
60. Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e are not persuaded
Hartman applies to the circumstances here."), rev d sub nom. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088
(2012).
61. See Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e conclude
that a plaintiff need not plead the absence of probable cause in order to state a claim for retalia-
tion.").
62. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006).
63. See Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 2007); Kennedy v. City of Villa
Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 217 n.4 (6th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that an "ordinary retaliation claim may not
need to demonstrate a lack of probable cause to succeed on his claim or wrongful arrest").
2012] 505
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II. HO WA RDS V. MCLAUGHLIN
In Howards v. McLaughlin, the Tenth Circuit sought to determine
the bounds of qualified immunity for law enforcement officials in a retal-
iatory arrest context.64 Steven Howards initiated a civil action against
four Secret Service agents (the Agents) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or alter-
natively under Bivens, claiming, inter alia, violations of his First and
Fourth Amendment rights. 65 The Fourth Amendment claim was dis-
missed as settled law and, therefore, will receive only cursory treatment
in this Comment.6 6 The court found that, because the Agents had proba-
ble cause to arrest Howards, the arrest and subsequent search of Mr.
Howards was lawful and not in violation of Mr. Howards's Fourth
Amendment rights.
The more complex and interesting question before the court was
whether the existence of probable cause, at the time of the arrest, provid-
ed the Agents with immunity from civil liability for arresting Mr. How-
ards in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. While the
court recognized the existence of probable cause for the arrest, it held
that a plaintiff bringing an action for violation of his First Amendment
rights under § 1983 or Bivens need not plead the absence of probable
cause.68 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit made clear that it will construe the
Supreme Court's decision in Hartman as applicable only in cases of re-
taliatory prosecution. 6 In following this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit
allows plaintiffs in retaliatory arrest cases to pursue civil remedies de-
spite the presence of probable cause and ensures a continued circuit split
on this issue.70
A. Facts
On June 16, 2006, Mr. Howards was attending a piano recital at the
Beaver Creek Mall in Beaver Creek, Colorado.7 At the same time, Vice
President Dick Cheney was also at the mall with a full Secret Service
security detail.72 Agent Gus Reichle was in charge of the Secret Service
Protective Intelligence Team that included Agents Dan Doyle, Adam
Daniels, and Daniel McLaughlin.73 While on his way to the piano recital,
Mr. Howards saw the Vice President and stated into his cell phone, "I'm
going to ask him [the Vice President] how many kids he's killed to-
64. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1147.
65. Id. at 1138.
66. Id. at 1143.
67. Id.
68. Id at 1148.
69. Id. ("We decline to extend Hartman's 'no-probable-cause' requirement to this retaliatory
arrest case.").
70. Id. at 1148-49 ("Accordingly, our prior precedent permits Mr. Howards to proceed with
his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding probable cause existed for his arrest.").
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day."74 Agent Doyle overheard this comment and subsequently relayed
the content of Mr. Howards's statement to Agent McLaughlin, directing
Agent McLaughlin to "pay particular attention to [Mr. Howards]."
Agent McLaughlin then relayed this information, including the directive
to monitor Mr. Howards, to Agent Daniels. Agent Doyle later admitted
that Mr. Howards's statement "disturbed" him, and that he found it "not
quite right."76
After waiting in a gathering crowd, Mr. Howards approached the
Vice President and told him that his "policies in Iraq are disgusting." The
Vice President responded, "thank you," and Mr. Howards departed the
area.7 7 While leaving, Mr. Howards made physical contact with the Vice
President's right shoulder.78 The parties dispute the nature of the contact,
but all parties concede that Mr. Howards did make physical contact with
the Vice President.79 Agents Daniels, McLaughlin, and Doyle did not
hear Howards's statement to the Vice President, but did observe Mr.
Howards touch the Vice President.8 0 Agents Daniels and McLaughlin
both testified that they did not believe the touch of the Vice President
provided the probable cause necessary to arrest Mr. Howards.81 Two
other agents, Mike Lee and Andrew Wurst, were close enough to hear
the verbal exchange between Mr. Howards and the Vice President, and
together decided to dispatch the Protective Intelligence Team to speak
with Mr. Howards.82
Although he had neither heard Mr. Howards's statements nor wit-
nessed the touching of the Vice President, Agent Reichle, as the intelli-
gence coordinator, had the responsibility of interviewing Mr. Howards.
Before reaching Mr. Howards, Agent Doyle briefed Agent Reichle on the
situation and the statements made by Mr. Howards. 84 Agent Reichle then
approached Mr. Howards and presented his badge.85 At that time Mr.
Howards refused to speak to Agent Reichle and attempted to step away.
Agent Reichle then stepped in front of Mr. Howards and a heated con-
versation ensued. Upon hearing Mr. Howards's opinion on the Iraq
War, Agent Reichle became "visibly angry."88 Agent Reichle then asked
74. Id. at 1136 (stating that Mr. Howards later clarified that this comment was in reference to
Vice President Cheney's role in the ongoing war in Iraq).
75. Id.
76. Id.at1145.
77. Id. at 1136.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1136 n.2.
80. Id. at 1136.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Mr. Howards if he had touched the Vice President, to which Mr. How-
ards responded that he had not.89 Upon receiving confirmation from
Agent Doyle that Mr. Howards had in fact touched the Vice President,
Agent Reichle arrested Mr. Howards for assault on the Vice President.90
Agents Doyle, Daniels, and McLaughlin assisted in the arrest, and sub-
sequently turned Mr. Howards over to the Eagle County Sheriff's De-
partment where Mr. Howards was charged with harassment under Colo-
rado state law.9' Mr. Howards was later released from custody, the state
charges were dropped, and no federal charges were ever filed. 92
B. Procedural History
Mr. Howards filed a civil action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or alter-
natively, under Bivens, in federal district court, charging, that the Agents
deprived him of his constitutional right to free speech by arresting him in
retaliation for his comments to Vice President Cheney regarding the war
in Iraq.9 3 Mr. Howards further charged that the arrest violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure.9 4 The defendants
moved for summary judgment, claiming that because the arrest was sup-
ported by probable cause, they were protected by qualified immunity. 95
The probable cause arose not out of the verbal exchange between Mr.
Howards and the Vice President, nor out of the physical touch of the
Vice President by Mr. Howards.96 Instead, the Agents argued that by
stating that he had not touched the Vice President, Mr. Howards made a
false statement to a federal official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.9
C. Majority Opinion
In addressing the Fourth Amendment claim, Judge Seymour, writ-
ing for the majority, held that "there is no doubt that Agent Reichle pos-
sessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Howards for lying to a federal agent
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001."9' Based on this finding, the court
unanimously held that because the Agents had probable cause for the
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1137-38.
91. Id. at 1138.
92. Id.
93. Id. (§ 1983 creates a cause of action against federal officials who violate an individual's




97. Id. at 1141. Section 1001 provides that "whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement ... shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years ... or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
98. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1142.
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arrest, there was no violation of Mr. Howard's Fourth Amendment
rights.99
The court then addressed the First Amendment claim. The Agents
argued that the Tenth Circuit's prior holding that plaintiffs are not re-
quired to demonstrate a lack of probable cause in First Amendment retal-
iation cases had been overruled by the Court in Hartman.'00 Judges Sey-
mour and Lucero were not persuaded, holding plaintiffs are not required
to demonstrate a lack of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases.' 0 ' The
court distinguished Howards from Hartman by recognizing the narrow
applicability of Hartman to the unique circumstances of retaliatory pros-
ecution cases.102
By holding that Hartman applies only in the retaliatory prosecution
context, the Tenth Circuit drew a clear distinction between "ordinary"
retaliation claims and retaliatory prosecution claims. 0 3 The court articu-
lated two ways in which cases of prosecutorial retaliation differ from
other retaliatory claims. First, there will generally be substantial circum-
stantial evidence to prove or disprove probable cause, and therefore, re-
quiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the absence of probable cause does not
impose a significant burden.10 Second, the complexity inherent in the
causation analysis is vastly different.'05 In a prosecutorial retaliation case
"the causal connection required . .. is not merely between the retaliatory
animus of one person and that person's own injurious action, but be-
tween the retaliatory animus of one person and the action of another."'0 6
That is, in a case of retaliatory prosecution, the plaintiff is not required to
prove the prosecutor was retaliating against him, but rather, that a third-
party who harbored retaliatory intent induced the prosecutor into filing
the charges.10 7 It is this additional link in the causation chain that sets
retaliatory prosecution cases apart from other retaliation cases, including
retaliatory arrest cases. In looking to these two differences, the Howards
court cast the decision in Hartman as a heightened pleading standard,
necessary only in cases that require the more complex causation analy-
sis.108
99. While the court was divided on the First Amendment issue, the court was unanimous in its
dismissal of the Fourth Amendment issue. Id at 1143.
100. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148.
102. Id. (holding that "extending the 'no-probable-cause' requirement to this ordinary retaliato-
ry arrest case and dismissing Mr. Howards' suit, would result in the Court's limited exception de-
vouring the rule" (emphasis added)).
103. Id. ("In light of the care the Supreme Court took to distinguish between complex and
ordinary retaliation claims, we are not persuaded Hartman applies to the circumstances here.").
104. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260-61
(2006)).
105. Id at 1146.
106. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262.
107. Id.
108. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148.
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D. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kelly's dissent argues that all of the Agents were entitled to
qualified immunity based on the presence of probable cause for the ar-
rest.1 09 The dissent argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Hartman
not only requires a pleading of the absence of probable cause in retaliato-
ry prosecution cases, but also in retaliatory arrest cases. 0 In supporting
this view, Judge Kelly articulates three arguments. First, he argues that
"[p]robable cause evidence will be readily available and relevant in most
retaliatory arrest cases."'' Second, Judge Kelly argues that while the
causation chain may not be as complex in retaliatory arrest cases as it is
in retaliatory prosecution cases, this alone should not eliminate the con-
sideration of probable cause as an element of the claim. 1 12
Lastly, the dissent argues that the Agents were entitled to qualified
immunity because the law was unclear at the time of the incident.113 The
Supreme Court has long held that public officials are entitled to qualified
immunity when their actions violate a constitutional right that is not
clearly established at the time of violation.' 14On this point, Judge Kelly
argues that due to the current circuit split, and the absence of a ruling
from the Tenth Circuit following Hartman, it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Agents knew that probable cause was insufficient to es-
tablish qualified immunity in a retaliatory arrest case."' It is this third
rationale that is ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, and provides
the basis for the Court to avoid answering whether probable cause cuts
off liability for retaliatory arrests. 116
III. ANALYSIS
The Howards decision illustrates the Tenth Circuit's continued ad-
herence to its view that probable cause does not, in and of itself, defeat a
retaliatory arrest claim.'" There are two principal reasons that the Tenth
Circuit was correct in not applying heightened pleading standard from
Hartman in a retaliatory arrest context. First, the existence of probable
cause-while probative-does not prove that the contested action by the
arresting officer was not taken for retaliatory reasons. Second, retaliatory




113. Id. at 1152.
114. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("We therefore hold that government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.").
115. Id.
116. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2097 (2012) ([W]hen Howards was arrested it
was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First
Amendment violation. Petitioners Reichle and Doyle are thus entitled to qualified immunity.").
117. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148 (majority opinion).
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arrest cases can be distinguished from retaliatory prosecution cases be-
cause both the complex causation chains and assumption of prosecutorial
regularity inherent in prosecutorial retaliation cases are absent from most
retaliatory arrest cases.
A. Probable Cause Does Not Preclude Retaliatory Causation
The existence of probable cause does not demonstrate a lack of re-
taliatory causation because probable cause is an objective standard,
viewed independent of the arresting officer's intent.' 18 Perhaps a simple
way to understand the idea of probable cause as an objective standard is
through a hypothetical. In this hypothetical, John Doe, a law abiding
citizen becomes outraged after seeing video on the local news of police
beating peaceful protestors. In response, John organizes a protest at the
local police station. The next day, several hundred protestors arrive at the
local police station carrying signs and singing protest songs. John is soon
identified as the leader of the protests and is asked by the local police
chief to put an end to the protest. John refuses to end the protest, which
incenses the police chief and the multitude of police officers observing
the peaceful protest. After walking away from the police chief, John at-
tempts to cross the street to rejoin the protest. However, John crosses
against the light. There are no cars on the road when John crosses the
street; nonetheless, John is immediately arrested by the police, who
charge him with jay-walking, disrupting traffic, and causing a public
disturbance. While placing the handcuffs on John, the arresting officer
remarks, "I hope this teaches you and your friends to keep your mouths
shut and stay at home."
After reviewing the police report, the district attorney determines
that there is insufficient evidence to pursue a conviction and subsequent-
ly drops all charges. Once John receives the news that all criminal charg-
es have been dropped, he quickly hires an attorney and files a § 1983
action against the arresting officer, the Police Chief, and the city. Unfor-
tunately for John, he lives in New York, where the federal courts are
bound by Second Circuit precedent, which requires pleading the absence
of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases brought under § 1983."9 Be-
cause John was crossing against the light, a statutory violation, the police
possessed probable cause at the time of his arrest. Unable to demonstrate
a lack of probable cause, John's claim is defeated on summary judgment.
While the police technically had probable cause to arrest John, the
arrest was clearly in retaliation for his leadership of the protest. This hy-
pothetical illustrates two distinct problems associated with requiring
plaintiffs to plead the absence of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cas-
es. First, the existence of probable cause provides only one possible ra-
118. See id.
119. See Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (2d Cir. 1992).
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tionale for the challenged arrest and in no way demonstrates that the ar-
rest was not motivated by retaliatory intent. 120 Second, the standard for
probable cause is minimal, falling below even a prima facie showing of
- * 121criminal activity.
By arguing that probable cause should bar civil actions for retaliato-
ry arrest, the Agents are essentially asking the Court to abandon the legal
principal of causation. 122 This argument is logical if one believes that
arrests are only motivated by a single factor: that factor being the exist-
ence of probable cause. In such a simplified world there would be no
need for courts to examine an officer's motivation because probable
cause would be the only causal factor for arresting an individual. How-
ever, we do not live in a simple, single-factor world. While probable
cause is a legal requirement to arrest an individual, in many cases it is
not the only factor motivating the arresting officer's decision, thereby
creating a multiple-factor causation problem.12 3 This problem can be
illustrated by returning to the earlier hypothetical. Imagine that John is
not immediately arrested, but instead leads a peaceful crowd of 200 peo-
ple on a march through town. After several blocks, the police stop the
march and tell the protestors that they are violating a city ordinance by
marching without a permit. The police then begin arresting protestors;
however, they don't arrest all of the protestors, instead arresting only
those who were leading the chants and protest songs. While there were
200 people participating in the protest-all in violation of the statute-
only the four leaders are arrested. Identical probable cause existed for the
arrests of all members of the protest, yet the police clearly targeted the
four individuals who were the most vocal in their opposition to police
brutality. Under the Hartman heightened pleading standard, the arrested
protestors would be barred from bringing a civil action against the police
because they cannot plead a lack of probable cause.' 24 This example il-
lustrates that even in a situation where probable cause is present; it may
not be the determinative causal factor in an arrest.
120. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Matzker v. Herr, 748
F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) ("An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would
have been proper.")).
121. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
96 (1964) ("[O]nly the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard
of probable cause....")).
122. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 517 (2011) ("Under the Restatement, in order for a
plaintiff to recover damages, a defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause or factor contrib-
uting to the injury, or even the primary factor in bringing the injury about, but need only have been a
substantial factor in bringing it about. If the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant will not be relieved from liability for those injuries even
though another force concurred to produce them." (citations omitted)).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis added)).
124. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
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The multiple-factor causation problem is not unique to retaliatory
arrest cases, and other areas of the law can shed light on how to best ap-
proach this issue. 12 Multiple-factor causation is often present in Title VII
employment discrimination cases where the employer articulates a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason for taking action against an employee.126
This assertion of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is akin to the
existence of probable cause in a retaliatory arrest context. While both
probable cause and a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason may demon-
strate that the defending party was justified in its action, it does not fore-
close the possibility that the action taken-by the employer or police
officer-was not motivated by other factors. 127 While there continues to
be much debate as to which causal framework should be applied in Title
VII actions,' 2 8 all of the frameworks utilized by the courts provide plain-
tiffs with some ability to demonstrate that an employer's stated legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory purpose is actually a pretext to discrimination.12 9
Similarly, in a retaliatory arrest context, the existence of probable cause
should place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate a dis-
criminatory animus was a motivating factor in the arrest, but should not
serve as a complete bar to suit.130
Multiple-factor causation is also an inherent problem in traditional
tort litigation, forcing states to enact comparative negligence statutes to
address the problem.'13 To date, forty-six states have abandoned the tra-
125. See id. at 258 ("As for the invitation to rely on common-law parallels, we certainly are
ready to look at the elements for common-law torts when we think about elements of actions for
constitutional violations . . . .").
126. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-42 (1989).
127. Id. at 241 ("[W]e also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based
on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.").
128. My discussion of the causation standards in Title VIl actions is at best cursory. It is only
designed to demonstrate the analogous relationship between a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose
in a challenged employment action, and the existence of probable cause in a retaliatory arrest con-
text. For an in-depth discussion of Title VIl causation, see Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell
Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 109-37 (2007).
129. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (articulating a
three-part burden shilling test which provides that after the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case
and the defendant has demonstrated a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose, the plaintiff has an
opportunity to demonstrate that the articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose is pretextual).
McDonnell Douglas was called into question in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 261-79
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (articulating a two-part test which provides that after the plaintiff has
proven a prima facie case, the defendant can be relieved of all liability by showing that it would have
made the "same decision" irrespective of the protected status of the plaintiff). Congress, rejecting
Price Waterhouse, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provided that plaintiffs need only
show that a protected trait was a "motivating factor." Upon such a showing, the employer can seek
to prove that it would have made the "same decision" even in the absence of the protected trait. Such
a showing does not bar liability, but can limit damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
130. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom.
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
131. See Peter Nash Swisher, Virginia Should Abolish the Archaic Tort Defense of Contributo-
ry Negligence and Adopt a Comparative Negligence Defense in Its Place, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 359,
360-61 (2011) (arguing that Virginia's contributory negligence standard is outmoded and does not
"fairly recognize and apportion damages according to the bedrock underlying tort legal principles of
accountability, deterrence, and distribution of loss").
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ditional concept of contributory negligence, which held that any culpabil-
ity on the part of the plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery, and instead
have adopted a comparative negligence standard.13 2 At first glance the
analogy between comparative negligence and probable cause in a retalia-
tory arrest case may not be clear. The concept of comparative negligence
recognizes that one's liability for a tortious act that injures another
should not be excused simply because the injured party may be partially
at fault.'33 Comparative negligence recognizes the need to analyze and
weigh multiple causal factors by assigning fault to each party on a frac-
tional basis.13 4 Similarly, a claim for the violation of an individual's civil
rights due to a retaliatory arrest should not be dismissed simply because
the plaintiffs actions created probable cause.13 5 This would be akin to
not imparting liability to a driver who runs a red light simply because the
car he hit was missing a tail light cover.
In a § 1983 claim for retaliatory arrest, the injury occurs not because
of the arrest itself, but by the suppression of a constitutionally guaranteed
right through means of an arrest.136 If courts were to apply the same theo-
ry that underpins comparative negligence to cases of retaliatory arrest, it
would require an examination of the relative weight of causal factors not
of the arrest itself, but of the arresting officer's motivation. Under such a
formulation, probable cause would create a strong presumption that the
arresting officer's motivation was within legal parameters, while still
providing plaintiffs with an opportunity to demonstrate, based on specific
facts, that other causal factors should be given more weight.
The argument that the presence of single causal factor should bar
plaintiffs from recovering in retaliatory arrest cases is even more trou-
bling when the single factor being advocated for as determinative is
probable cause. 137 The standard for probable cause is extremely low,
allowing police officers the ability to detain virtually any person at any
time, simply by alleging a minor violation or infraction.' Courts that
have held that the existence of probable cause forecloses the arrestee's
ability to recover civil damages in retaliatory arrest cases have adopted a
rule that assumes probable cause is the only causation of the arrest. Such
a default is problematic because the low standard for establishing proba-
132. Id. at 360.
133. Id. at 365-67.
134. Id.
135. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
137. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1141.
138. See Brian J. Foley, Policing From the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal
Procedure, 69 MD. L. REV. 261 (2010) ("In many cases, these people were not arrested because of
investigations; rather, they were swept off the street by a modem police force that has at its disposal
a multiplicity of minor offenses, a low standard of probable cause, and broad search and arrest
powers. In fact, anybody driving a car is subject to arrest and at least a limited search, either by
committing a minor offense or by being accused by the police of committing a minor offense."
(citations omitted)).
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ble cause will almost always provide an arresting officer with immunity,
regardless of what truly motivated the arrest.
B. Distinguishing Retaliatory Prosecution from Retaliatory Arrest
1. Lack of Complex Causation Chains
The Hartman Court held that because prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability for decisions to prosecute,13 9 proving a retaliatory
prosecution claim does not require a showing by the plaintiff that the
prosecutor was retaliating in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights. 14 0 Instead, the plaintiff must prove that a third-party actor was
successful in inducing the prosecutor to prosecute based on a retaliatory
animus. 14 1 It is because of this complex causation chain that claims for
prosecutorial retaliation require the plaintiff to plead and prove a lack of
probable cause. Returning to the earlier hypothetical, to prove a retaliato-
ry arrest John would not need to overcome a complex causation chain.
To show that his constitutionally guaranteed rights were violated, John
does not have to demonstrate that the arresting officer's retaliatory ani-
mus motivated the prosecutor to pursue criminal charges; instead John
need only prove that the arresting officer's action in arresting him was
based on a retaliatory motive.142
This is not to say that probable cause-or the absence thereof-is
not a relevant consideration in a retaliatory arrest context.14 3 There are
many cases in which the absence of probable cause would significantly
rebut the plaintiffs contention that he was arrested based on the retalia-
tory animus of the officer."'4 However, the standard for proving retalia-
tion is not foreclosed by the probable cause. Based on long established
case law, plaintiffs need only prove that the retaliatory animus was "a
substantial factor."14 5 By adding the requirement that plaintiffs plead and
prove the absence of probable cause, courts have implemented a new
heightened pleading standard. While this may be appropriate in retaliato-
ry prosecution cases, no court has articulated a compelling policy reason
for such a heightened standard in retaliatory arrest cases.14
139. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
140. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261-62 (2006).
141. Id. at 262.
142. Baldauf v. Davidson, 2007 WL 2156065, No. 1:04-cv-1571-JDT-TAB, at *2 (July 24,
2007) ("[Nlo such complex causation problems are present when a person brings a retaliatory arrest
claim that focuses entirely on an officer's bodily seizure of a plaintiff through the power of arrest.").
143. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1149-50 (stating that Agents Daniels and McLaughlin were
entitled to summary judgment because they had probable cause for the arrest and Howards presented
no evidence of a retaliatory motive on their part).
144. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265 ("[Sihowing an absence of probable cause will have high
probative force . . . .").
145. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
146. See Watson, supra note 43, at 128 ("Neither existing legal doctrine nor controlling prece-
dent recommend imposing the no-probable cause rule in actions for retaliatory arrest, and no court or
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2. Prosecutorial Presumption
The Hartman Court held that the long-recognized presumption of
regularity attached to prosecutorial decisions was a key factor in requir-
ing plaintiffs to prove a lack of probable cause in retaliatory prosecution
cases.147 This deference is grounded in the fact that courts are reticent to
regulate the decision making process of a prosecutor. 148 With this defer-
ence in mind, the Supreme Court has held that those wishing to pursue
claims based on selective prosecution have a heightened standard of
proof.14 9 Also inherent in the assumption of prosecutorial regularity is the
belief that prosecutors-as legal professionals and officers of the court-
have an intimate understanding of individual rights.o Based on this
knowledge, and the ethical standards that hold them to account, prosecu-
tors are presumed to make informed and ethical decisions when moving
forward with a prosecution."'
This rationale logically applies to retaliatory arrest cases because
these claims carry with them the implicit accusation that the prosecutor
abused his authority in bringing the case. In such cases it is reasonable to
require plaintiffs to overcome the heightened standard of proof to
demonstrate that a prosecution was in fact motivated by a retaliatory
animus."5 However, the differences of retaliatory arrest cases provide at
least two compelling arguments as to why a presumption of regularity
should not be extended to retaliatory arrest cases. First, in a retaliatory
arrest case, there is no accusation of misuse of prosecutorial power. In-
stead, the claim is based on the misuse of law enforcement power in vio-
lation of an individual right. 15 3 Not only is there no presumption of regu-
larity regarding law enforcement, but our criminal justice system has
gone to considerable lengths to restrict police power. In most circum-
stances police are required to have warrants before arresting or searching
a person or property. 154 Police must read suspects Miranda rights when
they are arrested, and must follow strict rules when interrogating sus-
scholar has yet articulated sufficiently persuasive policy argument in favor of applying the rule to
retaliatory-arrest claims.").
147. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263.
148. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) ("This broad discretion [afforded
the Executive] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited
to judicial review.").
149. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) ("Be-
cause such claims invade a special province of the Executive-its prosecutorial discretion-we have
emphasized that the standard for proving them is particularly demanding. . . .").
150. See Andrew Horwitz, Police Prosecution in Rhode Island: The Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 54 R.I.B.J. 5, 31 (2006).
151. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1361-62 (2011) (holding that all licensed
attorneys are "subject to an ethical regime designed to reinforce the profession's standards" and that
"[t]raining is what differentiates attorneys from average public employees").
152. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66.
153. Id. at262.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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pects.'" All of these protections are in place to serve as an independent
check on the decision making authority of law enforcement officials. 56
The second reason why the presumption of prosecutorial regularity
should not be extended to law enforcement officials in retaliatory arrest
cases is that prosecutors receive far more expansive training in the legal
system than their law enforcement counterparts.157 As discussed above,
due to this lack of training, law enforcement officials are confined by
more rigid rules and do not enjoy the same level of discretion as prosecu-
tors in discharging their duties. Taken together, these two fundamental
differences between prosecutors and law enforcement officials serve as
further support that the presumption of prosecutorial regularity should
not be extended to law enforcement officials. Absent this presumption,
the argument for requiring a pleading of no probable cause in a retaliato-
ry arrest claim is further weakened.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT
In December 2011, the Supreme Court granted Agents Reichle and
Doyle's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.' 58 In their petition, Agents
Reichle and Doyle advance four arguments as to why the Court should
reverse the Tenth Circuit Court's decision: (1) the ongoing circuit split
on the issue of probable cause in the retaliatory arrest context is an issue
that requires a judicial resolution that only the Supreme Court can pro-
vide; (2) the issue is one of great national importance, and that Secret
Service agents deserve special protection; (3) the presumption of regular-
ity which the Supreme Court cites prominently in Hartman should be
applicable not only to prosecutors, but also to Secret Service agents; and
(4) at the time of the incident the law concerning retaliatory arrest was
unclear, thus the agents were reasonable in assuming that Hartman
would be applied to retaliatory arrest cases.159
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas states that "at the time of
Howards' arrest it was at least arguable that Hartman's rule extended to
retaliatory arrest."l 6 0 In support of this holding, Justice Thomas notes that
"Hartman was decided against a legal backdrop that treated retaliatory
arrest and prosecution claims similarly," and "[a] reasonable official also
could have interpreted Hartman's rationale to apply to retaliatory ar-
155. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed.").
156. Id. at 447 ("Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-such as
these decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradi-
cated in the foreseeable future.").
157. See Horwitz, supra note 150, at 5.
158. Reichle v. Howards, No. 11-262, 2011 WL 3812626, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011).
159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *11-12.
160. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096 (2012). .
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rests."' 6 1 However, at the time of the incident, the established law in the
Tenth Circuit did not require a showing of the absence of probable cause
in retaliatory arrest cases.162 In fact, no Tenth Circuit opinion regarding
retaliatory arrest had ever applied the Hartman test. Because Hartman
was clear in distinguishing prosecutorial retaliation cases from "ordinary
retaliation" cases, the Tenth Circuit's precedent in reference to the latter
was undisturbed.163
Although the Supreme Court ultimately found for the Agent's based
on the lack of a clearly established right, it is worth examining the
Agents' other arguments in the larger conversation of what role probable
cause should play in a retaliatory arrest analysis.
The Agents' characterization of the current circuit split is neither
correct nor accurate. The Agents argue that the Tenth Circuit holding that
probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim "conflicts with the
majority rule established in several other circuit court decisions, includ-
ing decisions by the Eighth, Eleventh, Sixth, and Second Circuits.",6
This assertion is misleading in its entirety, and plain wrong on at least
one point. In seeking to cast the Tenth Circuit as a lone wolf in allowing
retaliation claims irrespective of the presence of probable cause, the
Agents ignore similar opinions issued by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.'65
More troubling is the Agents' assertion that the Sixth Circuit has imple-
mented a no probable cause pleading requirement.16 6 As discussed above,
the Sixth Circuit's treatment of retaliatory arrest cases is far from clear,
as Sixth Circuit courts have at times applied Hartman broadly to all retal-
iatory claims, while at other times held that "ordinary retaliation" claims
are not barred due to the presence of probable cause.167 The Agents also
attempt to cast dispersion on the Howards court, by implying the deci-
sion was based exclusively on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Skoog v.
County of Clackamas.168 While the Howards court does look to Skoog, it
is important to note that unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has
161. Id. at 2095.
162. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
163. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 n.12 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, our circuit has prior binding precedent that a plaintiff need not plead the absence of
probable cause to bring a retaliatory arrest claim."), rev'd sub nom. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct.
2088 (2012).
164. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at * 16.
165. See Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006). It should be noted
that the D.C. Circuit has yet to decide a retaliatory arrest claim post-Hartman, and therefore, it is
still bound by the precedent set forth in Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
166. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *18-19.
167. See Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 2007); Kennedy v. City of Villa
Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n ordinary retaliation claim . . . may not need to
demonstrate a lack of probable cause to succeed on his claim of wrongful arrest.").
168. Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1232; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *14, Reichle v. Howards, 2011
WL 3809375 (2011) (No. 11-262).
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long-established precedent stating that probable cause is not a bar to re-
taliatory arrest cases; therefore, absent a clear ruling from the Supreme
Court on this issue, the Howards court was bound to apply the Tenth
Circuit rule.' 6 9
The Agents also argued that their case deserved consideration from
the Supreme Court because it is an issue of "great national im-
portance."170 They are correct in stating that this issue does have national
implications; however, the faulty basis of their argument is that Secret
Service agents deserve special legal protection.' 7' While it would be easy
to impart special legal protection to the agents who risk their lives to
defend our elected leaders, such protections are inconsistent with the
stated purpose of § 1983 and Bivens, which is to ensure that an individu-
al's constitutional rights are not intruded upon by those acting under col-
or of the law.172
Unfortunately, it appears that Justice Ginsberg agrees with this ar-
gument. In her concurrence, she states that "[w]ere defendants ordinary
law enforcement officers, I would hold that Harman v. Moore, does not
support their entitlement to qualified immunity." 7 3 Justice Ginsberg is
quick to differentiate retaliatory arrest from retaliatory prosecution based
on the lack of a complex causation chain. 74 However, she voted with the
majority in its grant of qualified immunity to the officers based on her
belief that "[o]fficers assigned to protect public officials must make sin-
gularly swift, on the spot, decisions whether the safety of the person they
are guarding is in jeopardy."175 Pursuant to this rationale, Justice Gins-
berg believes that the Agents were justified in arresting Mr. Howards.176
On the narrow facts of this case such a determination appears ra-
tionale; however, a blanket protection afforded to all officers tasked with
protecting public figures could open the door to a more insidious type of
action on the part of governmental actors, giving political leaders the
opportunity to exploit their protective services to squash unpopular
speech. While the prospect of the President or Vice Presdient of the
United States using the Secret Service as mechanism to root out political
dissenters may seem far-fetched, Justice Ginsberg's recognition of a spe-
cial rule for Secret Service agents places this scenario squarely within the
realm of possibility.
169. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
170. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *21.
171. Id. at *22.
172. See supra notes 1, 12.
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In reality, the Agents presented a false choice by framing the argu-
ment as a contest between insulating Secret Service agents against litiga-
tion versus protecting an individual's right to recover for retaliatory ar-
rest. Nothing in the Howards decision should or would prevent any law
enforcement official from fulfilling his duty to protect any member of the
public, including elected officials. However, the Howards decision does
provide redress for individuals who can prove that their constitutional
rights were infringed upon based on a retaliatory animus.17 7 Such a rule
would not prevent Secret Service agents from taking action to prevent an
assassination attempt or other threat, but will encourage agents to take
pause to ensure that arrests of individuals are not based on a discrimina-
tory intent. Further, while the Tenth Circuit's decision in Howards
opened the door to claims of retaliatory arrest irrespective of probable
cause, the reality is that the presence of probable cause creates a strong
presumption in favor of the arresting officer. 78 Such a presumption in
and of itself provides a strong measure of protection to arresting officers,
as it will not easily be overcome.
In briefs before the Supreme Court, the Agents also argued that Se-
cret Service agents should be entitled to the same presumption of regu-
larity that the courts have extended to prosecutors. 17 9 It is this presump-
tion that the Court cites in Hartman as one of the factors leading to its
holding that probable cause forecloses the right to bring suit for retaliato-
ry prosecution.180 The Agents argue that Secret Service officers are spe-
cifically trained to deal with potential threats to public officials and,
therefore, should enjoy a presumption of regularity in their actions.'
While on its face this argument is plausible, it fails to take into account
the underlying reasons why prosecutors have long enjoyed this presump-
tion. The case law is clear that there is a "longstanding presumption of
regularity accorded to the prosecutorial decisionmaking."' 82 The pre-
sumption of prosecutorial regularity is grounded in the "recognition that
the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review," due
to the myriad of factors that a prosecutor must consider when deciding to
bring charges.1' Despite the Agents' arguments to the contrary, there is
no history of such deference being extended to law enforcement officials,
and their roles as peace officers should not entitle them to such defer-
ence. Prosecutors are charged with representing the interest of the people
and prosecuting those who commit crimes against the people or the state.
In contrast, law enforcement officials are charged strictly enforcement
177. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom.
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
178. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,267 (2006).
179. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *25-27.
180. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263.
181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *26-27.
182. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263.
183. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
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and do not require, nor enjoy, the latitude to determine when to exercise
their authority and when to withhold it.
CONCLUSION
Congress's purpose in enacting § 1983, as well as the public policy
rationale underpinning the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe, was to
protect the constitutional rights of individuals from infringement by
those acting under color of law. In order to maintain public faith in law
enforcement officials, citizens must have a mechanism for seeking re-
dress when police power is used to quash individual rights. This is how a
civilized society holds accountable the law enforcement agents to whom
it granted special powers, explicitly for the purpose of providing society
protection. If by simply establishing probable cause, law enforcement
officials are allowed to act with impunity in suppressing the rights of
individual citizens, then the fundamental purpose of § 1983-protecting
individual rights against the power of the state-will be rendered mean-
ingless. Allowing law enforcement officials to suppress an individual's
right to free speech, while hiding behind a shield of probable cause, will
directly erode the public confidence in the very people who are sworn to
protect us. In holding that probable cause does not bar civil liability in
retaliatory arrest cases, the Tenth Circuit has recognized the importance
of protecting individual rights; we can only hope that one day soon the
Supreme Court will do the same.
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